Stated limits

Privacy on a public chain is statistical, not absolute. These are the limits we know about.

Limits of the designCopy Anchor Link

• The sender is visible. A stealth payment hides the receiver, not the sender.
• Amounts and times are visible. Anyone can see how much moved and when.
• Everything after the payment is visible. Each move from a stealth address is public. Careless moves link it back to you. See Withdraw without leaking.
• A small crowd is a weak crowd. Your payment hides among other stealth payments that could be yours. Few users means a small crowd.

Limits of the setupCopy Anchor Link

• Your RPC provider sees your IP and the addresses your client queries. Use your own node or a private RPC if this matters.
• The name gateway knows which addresses it issued for your name, and a compromised gateway could misdirect new payments to a name. Pay the raw meta-address to avoid it.
• Lost wallet, lost keys. Your keys come from your wallet's signature. Nobody can restore them for you.
• Some smart-contract wallets cannot recreate the same keys. The client checks and stops before creating keys if yours cannot.

Accepted risksCopy Anchor Link

• No external audit yet. The leak scanner and the client are covered by unit and end-to-end tests, and the client's cryptography is cross-checked against the ScopeLift SDK. An external audit is planned and will be published in these docs. Until then, assume bugs are possible and start with small amounts.
• The client is new. It ships first as a beta.
• Scanning cost grows with usage. Every client checks every announcement, so the work grows with usage. Making it scale without trusting a server is on the roadmap.

Report a vulnerabilityCopy Anchor Link

Email security@ephemeral.money with the steps to reproduce. Please do not open a public issue for a security bug. We reply within 72 hours, fix first, then publish what happened and credit you unless you prefer otherwise. Rewards are on Bug bounty. The same contact is listed in /.well-known/security.txt.